Operationalizing Islamic Democracy: Challenges and Opportunities
By
Kamran A. Bokhari
© 2003
A working paper be presented at a panel entitled ‘Critical Assessment of Islamic Resources and their Appropriateness for Building Democratic Institutions ’ at the 4th Annual Conference of the Center for the Study of Islam & Democracy (CSID), Wyndham Washington Hotel, Washington D.C., May 16-17, 2003.
This paper will explore the ideological obstacles in the path of operationalizing a viable Islamic democracy, which appears to be the current nodal point in the development of the discourse on the issue. One of these obstacles, which this paper will deal with, involves the bifurcated nature of the educational curricula in Muslim countries along the fault lines better known as ‘ulum al-deen’ (Islamic sciences) and ‘ulum al-dunya’ (secular sciences). It is this partition of knowledge, which is the root cause of the ideological schisms that plague Muslim societies. Those trained in the traditional Islamic sciences are disproportionately unfamiliar with the secular social sciences and vice-versa. In other words, those with expertise on Islam have little or no understanding of statecraft, economics, and international politics. Similarly, those with expertise in the latter are ill equipped at dealing with the issue of Islam, and in particular Islamic governance. This seemingly polarized situation, practically and broadly, manifests itself not only in conflicting social strata, but also in the opposing political camps popularly known as Islamist and secularist. I will argue in this paper that the building and subsequent consolidation of an Islamic democracy necessitates the emergence of a discourse that constructively incorporates both sides of this divide. This paper will delineate possible ways and means leading towards the negotiation of a democratic space where opposing views on Islam can be peacefully distilled. I hope to achieve this by demonstrating how ijtihad can play a critical role as the agency of political development. I will further try to flush out how the revitalization of an atmosphere where the appreciation of the plurality of ijtihad will facilitate this process. In a way, this may even require Muslim societies to forge a fresh social contract, which can serve as a take-off point towards political development.
One of the consequences of the decline of the Islamic world and its subsequent exposure to European colonialism and imperialism has been the bifurcation of curriculums. Disproportionately those educated and trained in the traditional Islamic sciences (the u’lema class) are unfamiliar with the social sciences. The reverse also holds true, where again disproportionately, those educated in secular institutions and trained in the social sciences have very little understanding of Islam. This reality is primarily responsible for the polarization of Muslim societies, which can help explain the roots of the bloody civil war between Islamist and secularists political forces in Algeria raging since 1991. However and more importantly, this rift in Muslim societies has had serious ramifications in terms of political development and democratization.
The decline of the secular forces since the 1970s and the simultaneous rise of Islamists have placed the issue of democracy within the ideological boundaries of Islam. This explains the popularity of the all too famous adage “Is Islam compatible with democracy?” Furthermore, the brutal suppression of moderate mainstream Islamist groups in the Muslim world at the hands of the authoritarian regimes backed by the west has only served to strengthen the radical groups who have managed to capture the minds and hearts of the Muslims regarding the discourse on Islam and democracy. This coupled with the low levels of literacy and even lower levels of mass awareness has allowed the radicals to promote the idea that democracy is an alien concept imported from the secular west.
From the perspective of the audience, when the average Muslim sees his co-religionist with a western-style education calling for democracy, while those with traditional education denouncing it, he/she is bound to get confused. He/she is faced with an either/or type of situation and the choice is between what appears to be Islam on one hand and kufr (disbelief) on the other. In such an atmosphere of mutual exclusivity, the average individual Muslim is unable to reconcile the apparent contradictory attitudes from the two sides. The perpetuation of this standoff is what has impeded either side from making progress toward their common objective of establishing an Islamic state.
It may appear that there are two main groups among Islamists, one pro-democracy and the other anti-democracy. This dichotomous framework, however, is unable to account for, and capture the much more nuanced and richer latitude of the Islamist political spectrum. At present, Islamist groups with respect to their respective attitudes towards democracy are of three main types. On one end are the Rejectionists, who consider democracy as being antithetical to Islam. Whereas on the other polar end are the Adaptationists, some of whom go to the extent of arguing that democracy in fact has Islamic roots[i]. In between these two, seemingly, polar groups are the Reservationists, who accept that the republican form of government is the best mode of governance if the sovereignty of Allah is recognized, and that no law is legislated that is in violation of the shari’ah.
Thus, the whole discourse regarding Islam and democracy over the last century and a half, and in particular, the last five decades reveals that it is not a development, which can be conceptualized independent from the movement for the resurgence of Islam. The whole discussion of Islam’s relationship to democracy is taking place because of the revival of Islam. This would have been a moot issue if the Muslim world had embraced secularism after the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. Nevertheless, the fact that the debate on this matter exists is because unlike Judaism and Christianity, Islam has not gone a secular transformation. In fact, the revival of Islam can (in one sense) be explained as the upshot of the decline of the pro-western post-colonial secular nationalist state in the Muslim world.
In terms of the policy implications that stem from the debate on Islam and democracy, it is essential that western and particularly US policy-makers realize three points vital to the engendering of peace and inter-civilizational harmony. Firstly, the only serious protagonists of the incompatibility between Islam and democracy are extremists. These are not just those who are radical and militant Islamists. There are extremists in the west as well, in the form of right-wing ideologues and politicians who have connections to special interest groups (evangelical Christian groups and the pro-Zionist lobby). As long as both the Muslim world and the West are willing to entertain the ideas of the extremists on their respective sides, there is no hope of progress from the current situation of stalemate. Secondly, western support for authoritarian regimes in the Muslim world, e.g., Turkey, Egypt, Sau’di Arabia, Uzbekistan, etc. only discredits the moderate Islamists in the eyes of the Muslim masses. These moderates are not only suppressed by the regimes, but also face a challenge from the radicals, who are able garner support at their expense. Thirdly and most significantly is the tendency to view democratization in pure western terms and not allowing for the possibility of alternative routes to political development. This is where the responsibility falls on the shoulders of the epistemic community of academic scholars, policy analysts and journalists[ii]. This community is the vanguard that has the potential to influence public opinion as well policy-makers that modernization is not necessarily westernization.
Speaking of epistemic communities, it is important to take into consideration the state of the discipline of political science and its implications for the study of democratization in the Muslim world, Islamic political thought, and Islamist groups. As far as political science is concerned, comparativists have contributed more extensively on this issue than their counterparts in international relations, political theory/philosophy, or public law. This author’s work only contributes to the existing body of knowledge on the issue at hand. There is however a lacuna in the discipline where current trend towards employing rational choice, game theorizing, formal modeling, and quantitative approaches to the study of politics will also have consequences for the study of political Islam.
The afore-mentioned methods and paradigms privilege the empirical over the normative. In other words, these approaches may be able to shed light on political Islam in practice. This author argues that in order top better appreciate the empirical reality of Islamist groups in action in the Muslim world requires a solid theoretical background on the political philosophy of the Islamic resurgence. Thus, it is essential that political scientists, very few of whom have an expertise on the subject of political Islam, balance between qualitative and quantitative research. Otherwise, the discourse on this issue will become the exclusive intellectual property of area studies centers, departments of history, religious, and Islamic studies.
Apart from these epistemological concerns and more importantly for the Muslim world is the fact that much work has been done at the theoretical level in terms of the Islamization of knowledge project[iii], however, it is quite apparent that much more groundwork is needed. In any case, this ‘Islam v. Democracy’ debate must not continue for too long, as it serves to only further arrest the much-needed socio politico-economic development in the Muslim world. Muslim intellectuals must acknowledge that a feasible synthesis of Islam and democracy has yet to emerge. While the Islamist opponents of democracy are marginalized due to their inability to offer a coherent defense of their position(s)[iv], nevertheless, the fact remains that the proponents of democracy have also not been able to adequately address this issue till date. Consequently, the dialectic between the two sides has produced a very marginal positive effect (if at all).
Notwithstanding the preferred outcome, the fact remains that the Islam v. democracy debate is bound to continue and linger on for some time in the near future. In order to demonstrate that Islam is compatible with democracy requires extensive work on the theoretical level. Change in the attitudes of Muslim masses, as well as those who are unfortunately still advocating medieval and archaic political programs and models regarding this critical issue will only come through a sustained effort on the part of the Muslim intelligentsia. Furthermore, the emancipation of the Muslim world from the yoke of authoritarianism will only take place if the common Muslim is enlightened about the relationship between Islam and democracy, which requires as a pre-requisite a dispassionate and objective synthesis of both the Islamic and the social sciences.
This thesis seeks to contribute to the existing literature on the issue of Islam and democracy by offering an understanding of how ideas by shaping the identity and preferences of actors can bring about a shift in behavior of these actors. Such actors in turn are the driving force that mobilizes the masses towards the goal of democratization, as a possible avenue towards the management of Intra-Muslim conflict as well as the conflict between the western civilization and the Muslim weltanschauung. Critics may argue that this is a naïve and simplistic approach to the world of realpolitik, and interests ultimately hold sway over ideals. While there may perhaps be some verity in this observation, it does not however offer a solution and is at best a diagnosis of the problem and at worst a call for pessimism.
This treatise argues that ideas indeed played a major role in both initiating and developing the discourse of Islamic democracy or democratic Islam, which in turn then can lead to the changes in the behavior of the parties to the conflict. Although the existing literature addressing this issue is saturated with arguments that can only explain certain specific aspects of it. I claim that my ideational approach provides a better framework for explaining the various components that constitute the issue, i.e., the west, Islamist groups, non-Islamist Muslim masses and groups. This thesis also furnishes a framework for analyzing the increasing number of experiments at democratization in other areas of the Muslim world, the Balkans, the Caucasus, Central Asia, the Middle East, and South Asia. It may also facilitate in gauging the success or failure of these attempts to move towards greater participation in the political process. The wider ramification is that, under certain conditions, ideas shape the approach of political actors, which in turn then effect changes in the political landscape of the areas under question.
One of the functional policy corollaries that stems from this treatise is that it equips policy makers with the underlying dynamics that shape a political Islam, which can be extremely instructive in alleviating apprehensions of militant Islam and can possibly contribute to the better understanding of the dynamics that shape the politics of the Muslim world. Needless to state that Islam and democracy will remain relevant theme of discourse both here in the west as well as the Muslim world, for it is the development of this very subject that can possibly release the Muslim world from the clutches of a now chronic state of arrested political development. Moreover, progression along the lines of an Islamic democratic discourse can also serve to moderate between the polarized camps, i.e., Islamist and secularist. It is even more significant in the light of the fact that there is an ongoing process of Islamic resurgence on a global scale, which is spreading across continents especially in the wake of 9/11. Finally, this exposition underscores the ongoing evolution of modern Islamic political thought characterized by the intra-Islamist debate between the moderate and extremist forces sensitized especially in the current post-9/11 global atmosphere.
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[i] For the best exposition of this viewpoint, please see, Abdel Aziz Sachedina, The Islamic Roots of Democratic Pluralism (Oxford: New York, 2001).
[ii] For a theoretical exposition of the role of epistemic communities and US foreign policy making with respect to political Islam please see Kamran A. Bokhari, “A Divided Epistemic Community & Political Islam: A Constructivist Approach to Understanding the Making of United States Foreign Policy,” American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences 19:3 (Summer 2002); 11-30.
[iii] This enterprise to was undertaken by the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) based in Herndon, VA back in the early 1980s and continues.
[iv] The use of the plural here is to indicate that the anti-democracy camp is not a monolithic structure, rather there exists is a diverse range of viewpoints that are espoused by the sundry groups in this camp for their opposition to democracy.